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Cold War Dilemmas, Superpower Influence, and Regional Interests: 
Greece and the Palestinian Question, 1947-49 
 
At the beginning of the Cold War, two regional crises broke out almost at the same 
time in the Eastern Mediterranean. The outbreak of the Greek civil war in 1946 made 
Greece the first battlefield of the Cold War, and its outcome put the country firmly in 
the western camp. Another regional crisis was caused by Resolution 181 adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1947, which recommended 
the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state leading to the first Arab-
Israeli war of 1948-49. The outcome was the beginning of the Middle Eastern 
question in a form which exists until today. 
Not surprisingly, there is a significant literature concerning great-power policy 
towards the Palestinian question, as well as the emergence of the state of Israel and 
the first Arab-Israeli war.1 However, the attitude of smaller states, especially of the 
                                                             
1 See, for example, Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle between the British, the 
Jews and the Arabs, 1935-48 (London: Deutsch, 1979); Michael Joseph Cohen, Truman and Israel 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and 
Realities (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987); Zvi Ganin, Truman, American Jewry, and Israel, 1945-
1948 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Joseph Heller, The Birth of Israel, 1945-1949: Ben-
Gurion and his Critics (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000); William Roger Louis, The 
British Empire and the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar 
Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984); Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the 
Soviet Bloc, 1947-53 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974); Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United 
States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962 (London: Leicester University Press, 
1996); Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 
Koumas 
Eastern Mediterranean, towards the Middle Eastern crisis of 1947-49 has been 
neglected. Indeed, research on major international issues has hitherto focused on the 
role of the great powers/superpowers, as major international actors and initiators of 
policy. The general perception is that small states, unless they are directly involved in 
an international problem, usually display limited interest. During the Cold War, 
international issues, at least in the First and the Second Worlds, assumed a character 
where “toeing the party line” (i.e. supporting the stance of one or the other 
superpower, according to the camp a country belonged to) was the accepted norm: 
while countries like Britain or France had some leeway, smaller states were expected 
to conform with the great powers. 
This article will attempt to analyze Greek policy on the Palestinian question 
between the U.N. decision to divide Palestine into two states and the end of the first 
Arab-Israeli war. In 1947-49 Greek governments adopted a pro-Arab stance on the 
issue. Greece was the only European country which voted against partition; during the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, although officially maintaining a position of strict 
neutrality, Athens repeatedly expressed its solidarity with the Arab states. As Greek 
officials had put it, neutrality facilitated the Arab interests, as the new Israeli state was 
much more dependent on foreign military aid than the Arab states.2 For example, 
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Greece banned all transit across its territory to Israel and impounded arms shipments 
for Israel while in transit through Greek ports.3 Furthermore, in September 1948 two 
spitfires, which Tel Aviv purchased in Czechoslovakia, had been confiscated by 
Themistocles Sophoulis’ government on landing in Rhodes for refueling.4 After the 
war Greece consistently adopted pro-Arab positions at the international 
organizations.5 On 11 May 1949 Greece abstained in the vote on Israel’s admission to 
the United Nations despite the fact that Alexis Kyrou, Greece’s representative at the 
United Nations, considered that nothing could come out of it.6 Finally, on 15 March 
1949 Greece gave Israel de facto recognition only.7 
In 1947-49 Greece was faced with a choice in the Middle East between the 
Arab option and the Israeli option. The fact that a small Mediterranean state adopted 
an anti-Israeli policy at a time of ongoing civil war, despite extensive dependence on 
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the Americans who were sponsoring the state of Israel, calls for an explanation. This 
will involve U.S.-Greek relationship, Athens’ definition of its interests in the region, 
the Greeks’ perception of developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also U.S. 
policy, which left a wide range of options for the policy of its lesser ally. 
 
Britain and the Palestinian question from the Balfour Declaration to the end of 
the British mandate 
British involvement in Palestine stretched back in the First World War. Before 1918 
the Arab lands eastward to Egypt were dominated by the declining Ottoman Empire. 
However, during the First World War, as the Ottoman Empire joined the Central 
Powers, Britain promised the Arabs independence in return for their support against 
the Ottomans. At the same time, however, London and Paris concluded the so-called 
“Sykes-Picot Agreement”, which divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
into areas of post-war French and British influence. The situation was further 
complicated in November 1917 as the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour 
promised the Jews support for a national homeland in Palestine.8 
After the end of the Great War, Palestine was granted to Britain as a mandate 
and large numbers of Jews began to immigrate to the area. For the next two decades, 
dramatic and often violent demographic shifts took place between the Arabs and the 
Jews in Palestine. After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 and as anti-Semitist regimes 
emerged across Europe, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased significantly. In 
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the late 1930s the Arabs revolted against both the British and the Zionists in order to 
halt the Jewish state-building project. The Second World War and Holocaust made 
the situation in Palestine much worse.9 As a result, in 1946 the Jewish population in 
Palestine had increased to six hundred thousand (sixty thousand in 1917), while the 
Arabs numbered approximately one million, three hundred forty thousand (six 
hundred thousand in 1917).10 
In the late 1930s the British government under Neville Chamberlain had 
envisaged the establishment of an independent Palestine state within ten years, while 
a limit of seventy-five thousand Jewish immigrants was set for the period of 1939-44. 
Nevertheless, after Winston Churchill’s ascendancy to the premiership, 
Chamberlain’s policy was gradually abandoned and in 1943 London started planning 
the partition of Palestine with the creation of an Arab and a Jewish state. In other 
words, during the war the British were trying to play both sides.11 
After the end of the war, in order to focus on domestic reconstruction and 
economic recovery, and unable to cope with the ongoing fighting in the area, Clement 
Attlee’s Labor government decided to relinquish Britain’s mandate in Palestine. 
Against this background, in April 1947 the British government brought the Palestinian 
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question before the United Nations asking that the General Assembly make 
recommendations concerning the future status of the region. A special General 
Assembly met from 28 April to 15 May and set up a committee to make a preliminary 
study and submit a report. In mid-June the eleven-member U.N. Special Committee 
on Palestine (UNSCOP) arrived in Jerusalem for an on-the-spot investigation of the 
problem. For a five-week period UNSCOP toured Palestine and visited Lebanon, 
investigating conditions and hearing witnesses.12 
On 31 August UNSCOP submitted its report to the U.N. Secretary-General 
Trygve Lie. The committee recommended that the British mandate be terminated and 
Palestine be granted its independence at the earliest practicable date. Eight members 
of UNSCOP (Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Czechoslovakia, Netherlands, Uruguay, 
Sweden and Peru) prepared the so-called “majority plan,” suggesting the partition of 
Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. These two states were to become 
independent after two years. During the transition period, the British would continue 
to administer Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations. The “majority plan” 
also recommended the creation of a special international regime in the City of 
Jerusalem, constituting it as a corpus separatum under the administration of the 
United Nations. A “minority plan,” signed by three members of the committee 
(Yugoslavia, India and Iran), preferred an independent federal state of Palestine, 
following a transitional period not exceeding three years. Jerusalem would become 
the capital of the federal state.13 
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On 23 September the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Palestinian question. The committee invited the representatives of the Arab High 
Commission and the Jewish Agency for Palestine to explain their views on the future 
of Palestine. The Arabs rejected both plans, insisting on the establishment of an Arab 
state in the whole of Palestine. On the contrary, the Jewish Agency, though criticized 
“the majority proposal concerning Jerusalem,” accepted the partition solution on the 
condition of the “immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign 
control of its own immigration.” The Ad Hoc Committee, after making a number of 
changes, adopted the UNSCOP majority recommendations and on 25 November 
submitted its final report to the Assembly for consideration.14 
On 29 November the General Assembly adopted the U.N. partition plan by a 
vote of 33 to 13 and ten abstentions. However, the Arabs declared their determination 
to block the implementation of partition by all means at their disposal, and a new 
round of hostilities broke out in the Middle East. On 14 May 1948 the British civil 
administration in Palestine was terminated and a provisional government of Israel was 
established. Following Israel’s proclamation of independence, Egypt, Transjordan, 
Iraq and Syria attacked the new state. The Arab-Israeli war ended a few months later 
with the conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt (24 February), 
the Lebanon (23 March), Jordan (3 April) and Syria (20 July). Israel increased its 
territory by 21 percent, Transjordan gained the West Bank and Egypt the Gaza Strip. 
In contrast, the Palestinians lost all the territory they had been granted by Resolution 
181. By the end of 1948 more than seven hundred fifty thousand Palestinians had 
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become refugees, while almost one hundred fifty thousand Palestinians came under 
Israeli rule.15 
 
Decision-making in Athens and the great powers, 1944-49 
In the aftermath of Greece’s liberation from the Axis occupation, London struggled to 
retain its pre-war influence in the country. Since 1941/42 the British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill had constantly advocated the restoration of the pro-British King 
George II. However, in the summer of 1944, when the withdrawal of German forces 
from Greece was imminent, Britain became alarmed by the perceived capabilities of 
the Communist-controlled resistance organization EAM (National Liberation Front) 
to fill the power vacuum and seize control of the country. Although the British had 
worked concertedly to undermine this organization at least since the spring of 1943, 
EAM managed to expand its control to large areas of Greece. At the same time, the 
remnants of the traditional political parties had long lost their influence in Greek 
politics, while the pro-British government-in-exile was not in a position to control 
developments in occupied Greece. Although in October 1944 Joseph Stalin had 
agreed that Greece would lie within the British sphere of influence, the prospect of a 
Communist takeover could not be ruled out.16 
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 Against this background, the first post-war Greek governments were unable to 
impose full control on the country without substantial British economic and military 
assistance. This became obvious in December 1944, when the Communist-led forces 
of EAM were defeated in the Battle of Athens only after the decisive intervention of 
the British forces.17 For the next two years, dependence on Britain largely determined 
Greece’s foreign and domestic policy. The rise of the Labor Party to power in July 
1945 did not change significantly British policy towards Greece. In September 1946, 
following a plebiscite which led to the restoration of monarchy in Greece, a full-scale 
civil war broke out. Once again, the British backed the Greek coalition government 
against the communist forces.18 
In early 1947 the British government informed Washington of its inability to 
continue aiding Greece. The U.S. President Harry Truman was determined to contain 
communism in Greece (as well as in Turkey) and responded with what became known 
as the Truman Doctrine. 19  The announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan, in March and June 1947 respectively, raised the immediate prospect of 
U.S. military and economic aid to Greece but also marked the beginning of a new era 
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of Greek dependence on the United States. Thus, after March 1947 the United States 
gradually took over Britain’s role as the primary foreign influence in Greece.20 
However, even this new dependence in the painful conditions of a civil war 
did not prevent the decision-makers in Athens from trying to form a long-term 
strategy in the context of Greece’s relations with its western allies. During the late 
1940s, traditional Greek foreign policy-making had undergone serious 
transformations. The Greek Prime Minister Themistocles Sophoulis (born in 1860) 
was too old to affect Greek policy-making, 21  while Constantinos Tsaldaris, the 
Foreign Minister and the leader of the largest government party, had no experience on 
foreign issues. As a result, it was the experienced diplomat Panayiotis Pipinelis rather 
than the political leaders, who played a prominent role in Greek foreign policy-
making. 
Pipinelis was probably Greece’s most famous Realpolitiker.22 He entered the 
diplomatic service in 1922 and he first came in contact with politics a decade later, 
when he became diplomatic advisor of Panayis Tsaldaris’ government. During the 
Second World War he followed the Greek government in exile and after the 
restoration of monarchy in September 1946 became head of the Political Office of 
                                                             
20 See, A. A. Fatouros, “Building Formal Structures of Penetration: The United States in Greece, 1947-
1948,” in John O. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis (Hanover, NH: University Press 
of New England, 1981), pp. 239-258; and John O. Iatrides, “Britain, the United States and Greece, 
1945-9,” in David H. Close, ed., The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization (London: 
Routledge, 1993). 
21  Dionysis Chourchoulis, Θεμιστοκλής Σοφούλης: πολιτική βιογραφία [Themistocles Sophoulis: 
Political Biography] (Athens: Hellenic Parliament Foundation, 2014), pp. 309-338. 
22 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967 (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006), p. 136. 
Greece and the Palestinian Question, 1947-49 
11 
 
King George II.23 On 7 June 1947 Pipinelis was appointed Permanent Undersecretary 
of the Foreign Ministry. A few days later, he established the Council of Political 
Affairs.24 This council, consisting of the directors of all departments of the Foreign 
Ministry and a representative of the Greek Army, held more than one hundred 
meetings under Pipinelis’ presidency until mid-1950. The Council of Political Affairs 
was to become the main foreign policy-making centre, as its recommendations were 
usually adopted by the Greek governments. 
 
Greece’s Cold War priorities and the Arab world 
A pro-Arab attitude was strictly connected with Greece’s post-war geopolitical 
position and security problem. According to Pipinelis, after the end of the Second 
World War and the establishment of communist regimes in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, 
Greece had become a front-line state. In his book on Greek foreign policy, published 
in 1948, Pipinelis offered a geopolitically-based analysis of the country’s postwar 
security problem: 
“The forward defensive line of the Danube and the Balkan hinterland has 
disappeared. The enormous geopolitical pressures of continental Europe, which 
formerly were partially being checked out on the Balkan territories of the Ottoman 
Empire and then on Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, now come to throw their full weight 
directly on our borders. … The importance of Greece as a beach-head of the oceanic 
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powers has multiplied, both for the oceanic powers and for the continental ones. The 
danger has become larger, the pressure on the country more tense.”25 
In order to compensate for the loss of strategic depth, Pipinelis insisted that 
Greece was obliged to broaden and deepen its ties with the other Mediterranean 
countries and in particular with Italy, Turkey and the Arab states.26  Although he 
realized that it was not really possible for Greece to solve its security problem through 
participation in Mediterranean alliances, he admitted that the post-war situation in the 
Balkans did not leave many alternatives for Athens.27 Pipinelis’ analysis was fully 
adopted by the Greek Chargé to Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq Nikolaos 
Chatzivassiliou, an ardent supporter of Greek-Arab cooperation.28 
In the minds of Greek policy-makers, Athens’ attitude towards the Palestinian 
question was strictly connected with Greek Mediterranean strategy and in particular 
with the Greek efforts to conclude the so-called Mediterranean Pact. The first country 
which aired the idea of a pact between the Mediterranean states was Turkey. In March 
1947 the Turkish Ambassador in Paris Numan Menemençioğlu suggested to the 
British the conclusion of a regional pact which would include Turkey, Greece and 
Egypt. A few months later, Ankara came back with a new proposal according to 
which the pact should include not only the Mediterranean countries but also Britain 
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and the United States. Turkey hoped that such a pact would enhance its external 
security against the Soviet threat.29 
Greece endorsed the Turkish proposal for formal co-operation between the 
Mediterranean states. However, Athens insisted that the Mediterranean Pact should 
also include the Arab states.30  According to Pipinelis, after the establishment of 
communist regimes in the Balkans, Greece was important for the United States as a 
bridge to the Arab world and Turkey.31 Although he was against the conclusion of a 
military alliance with the Arabs,32 he was convinced that Greece should demonstrate 
its ties with the Arab states and play a leading role in linking the Middle Eastern states 
with the Western world. In other words, enhancing Greek-Arab relations was part of a 
deliberate policy to involve the United States even closer in the defense problems of 
Greece through the back door. As Pipinelis explained to the U.S. Chargé d’ Affaires 
in Athens, James Keeley, “Greece had to consider her relations with Moslems” in 
order to promote “Greek inspired project for Pan Mediterranean pact as bulwark 
against Communist pressure from north.”33 
In this context, on 9 August 1947 Pipinelis asked Chatzivassiliou to enquire 
whether the Arab states were willing to consider a co-operation with Greece, on the 
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condition that Britain and the United States would raise no objections.34 In early 
February 1948 the Greek Ambassador at Washington Vassilios Dendramis informed 
John Jernegan, head of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs of the State 
Department that his government “had been thinking of the possibility of forming an 
entente among Greece, Italy, Turkey, and the Arab states.” Dendramis added that 
“some form of leadership from the great powers would be necessary” and that the 
United States and Britain “might give the necessary support and encouragement.”35 
However, neither the Arabs nor the Turks showed enthusiasm for such a pact. 
Furthermore, after U.S. de facto recognition of Israel on 14 May 1948, it was not 
possible for the Arabs to participate in the Mediterranean Pact. Thus, Athens 
abandoned the idea.36 
Greek pro-Arab attitude towards the Palestinian question derived also from the 
fear that Britain’s loss of Palestine could shift the balance of power in the Middle East 
and open the door to Soviet penetration in the region. The feeling that British 
influence in the Middle East was collapsing created strong fears in Athens. As early 
as in April 1947, Leon Melas, the Director General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, 
had stressed that Greece was against the Egyptian proposal for immediate termination 
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of the British mandate in Palestine as such an evolution would facilitate “Soviet 
penetration of Middle East.”37 
Furthermore, some Greek officials went as far as to argue that the new state of 
Israel would incline towards the Soviet Union. In September 1947, during a meeting 
of the Council of Political Affairs, the representative of the General Staff Colonel 
Karatzenis warned that the USSR aimed at extending its influence in the Middle East 
through Israel and added that the new state would become a “Slav outpost” in the 
area. Karatzenis claimed that “Jewish terrorists were trained in Moscow.” 38  In 
December 1947 Chatzivassiliou commented that communist penetration in Syria and 
Lebanon was growing and that the partition scheme gave to the “Soviets opportunity 
of entering Middle East and thus further endangers Greece’s security.”39 The Greek 
Chargé called Israel a “willing instrument of Soviet intrigue”, a “pro-Soviet Zionist 
state” and a “hot spot in the Middle East.”40  Pipinelis adopted these arguments, 
especially the one regarding the Soviet support for Israel.41  In late 1947 he told 
Keeley that “just as Arabs fear that Zionists want Palestine as spearhead for political 
expansion in Middle East, so it is feared Soviet Russia will utilize her backing of 
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partition to get her head within the Arab tent.”42 In September 1948, four months after 
the United States had recognized Israel, Pipinelis still expressed worries about 
information concerning the rise of communist influence in Israel and the Soviet 
penetration in the Middle East.43 
Greek fears were not completely unjustified. The danger of Soviet penetration 
in the Middle East was also mentioned by U.S. high-ranking officials who were 
against the partition of Palestine for exactly the same reasons. For example, in 
January 1948 George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff, argued that 
Resolution 181 was “favorable to Soviet objectives of sowing dissention and discord 
in non-communist countries.”44 Samuel Kopper of the Office of Near Eastern and 
African Affairs of the State Department mentioned as one of the reasons that led 
Stalin to back partition “the possibility of the establishment of a Jewish state which 
might subsequently come within the USSR orbit.” According to Kopper, such an 
evolution “would place the USSR in a highly strategic position at the eastern end of 
the Mediterranean and further its encirclement plans against Greece and Turkey.”45 
Stalin’s policy towards Palestine puzzled officials in the Western world. Until 
1947 the USSR had favored a “single independent democratic Palestine” and rejected 
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mass Jewish emigration to the Middle East. Thus, Soviet support for an independent 
Jewish state was considered to be a remote possibility.46 However, in April 1947 
Stalin completely changed his attitude towards the future status of Palestine. In his 
speech of 14 May 1947 before the General Assembly, the Soviet Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, stated that if the establishment of a single Arab-
Jewish state proved impossible “then it would be necessary to consider the second 
plan which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent single 
states.”47 On 13 October the Soviet representative at the Ad Hoc Committee, Semen 
Tsarapkin, argued that Moscow favored the second of the two alternatives, namely the 
partition plan.48 Finally, on 29 November the USSR voted in favor of partition, with 
the other members of the Eastern bloc following her lead.49 
Stalin provided full support to the Zionist movement even after the adoption of 
partition by the United Nations. In late 1947, as the United States had imposed an 
arms embargo on Palestine and its neighboring states, Zionist representatives reached 
an agreement with Moscow according to which Czechoslovakia stopped the delivery 
of arms to the Arabs and started supplying the Israelis. Although Moscow rejected the 
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Jewish request for Soviet military aid, cooperation between Prague and Tel Aviv 
continued until 1951.50 
Soviet policy on Palestine emerged from both ideological and geopolitical 
considerations. In the early Cold War period, Stalin and Molotov shared the view that 
the Middle East was an area of likely confrontation between Britain and the United 
States. The Soviet leader was also convinced that Zionism was nothing more than 
another national liberation movement that Moscow had to support in order to 
undermine the British dominant position in the region. Therefore, although the 
Soviets were afraid of a possible strengthening of U.S. position in the region, they 
supported the partition scheme. To put it simply, Stalin believed that the 
establishment of Israel and British-American rivalry on Palestine could open the gates 
for Soviet penetration in the Middle East. At the same time, by advocating the 
establishment of an Israeli state in Palestine, he aimed at increasing the Soviet 
popularity among the Jews all over the world.51 
Thus, it was not a paradox that Greek policy-makers were concerned about a 
possible Soviet interference in the Eastern Mediterranean. Memories of earlier 
attempts of the USSR to extend its influence in Turkey and Iran also played a role to 
these Greek fears. The fact that during the Greek civil war the states of the Eastern 
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bloc were supplying weapons to the Greek Communist Democratic Army intensified 
Athens’ fears of Soviet policy in the wider region.52 
 
Greek regional interests and the Palestinian question 
Geopolitical pressures and security priorities were not the only reasons for which the 
Council of Political Affairs finally recommended that Athens should vote against 
partition. Greek pro-Arab policy was also determined by the need to protect Greek 
regional interests in the Middle East. In particular, the Greek government had to take 
into account the position of the large Greek community in Egypt, the existence of the 
Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem with its mainly Arab-Orthodox flock and Greek 
commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
 In the mid-19th century the Greeks of Egypt were numbered approximately 
three thousand “heads of families.” After the “cotton boom” of the 1860s, the number 
of Greeks increased significantly as they benefited from the privileges Egypt 
(formally a province of the Ottoman Empire) provided to the citizens of capitulatory 
powers. In 1922 Egypt emerged as an independent state but the capitulations system 
remained. As a result, in the 1920s the number of Greeks reached its peak as almost 
one hundred thousand “persons of Greek race” living in Egypt. 53  However, the 
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Montreux Convention of 1937 led to the abolition of capitulations. According to the 
convention, the future status of foreigners would be arranged through the conclusion 
of bilateral treaties between Egypt and the ex-capitulatory powers. After the Second 
World War, the situation of Greeks further deteriorated, as the Egyptian government 
introduced laws which aimed at reinforcing the position of Egyptian citizens in the 
labor market. For instance, in 1947 Cairo passed the so-called Company Law, which 
stipulated that all private companies should employ a minimum of 75 percent of 
Egyptian nationals within a period of three years (for workers the percentage should 
reach 90 percent). Naturally, the process of Egyptianization of employment largely 
affected the working population of Greek community.54 
 In mid-1947 Athens approached Cairo with a view to starting negotiations for 
the conclusion of a Consular Convention and a Treaty of Establishment according to 
the provisions of the Montreux Convention.55 Not surprisingly, in September 1947 the 
Council of Political Affairs claimed that voting in favor of the creation of an Israeli 
state would cause a serious crisis in Greek-Egyptian relations, with catastrophic 
consequences for the large Greek community in Egypt.56 In February 1948 Pipinelis 
argued that the conclusion of an agreement with Cairo would have been impossible if 
Greece voted in favor of the partition plan. For this reason, he added, Athens should 
insist on its pro-Arab orientation.57 
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In other words, the fact that in 1947-48 the Greek government was negotiating 
the conclusion of a Consular Convention and a Treaty of Establishment with Egypt 
made Athens vulnerable to pressures not only from the Egyptian government but also 
from the Greeks of Alexandria. In 1947 a delegation of Egyptian Greeks arrived in 
Athens and asked the Greek government to vote against the partition of Palestine.58 
Until the mass exodus of Egyptian Greeks which took place from 1961 to 1966,59 the 
Greek communities of Egypt constituted a significant non-governmental pressure 
group which influenced Greek foreign policy options towards the Middle East. In 
contrast, during the German occupation of 1941-44, the great majority of Jews was 
deported from Greece and had been executed by the Nazis in extermination camps.60 
As a result, after the Second World War the local Jewish community was too weak to 
influence Greek governments towards the adoption of a pro-Israeli policy. 
Another reason for which Athens adopted a pro-Arab stance in 1947-49 was 
the need to protect the interests of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem. 
According to the plan presented by the Ad Hoc Committee, Jerusalem would be 
placed under an international regime. In addition, Resolution 181 envisaged a 
demilitarized Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under a special international regime. 
According to the resolution, the Trusteeship Council should within five months 
“elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City.” The resolution also provided 
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that the Trusteeship Council should appoint the Governor of Jerusalem who in turn 
would be responsible for “the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and 
sites located in the city.”61 
In September 1947 Pipinelis expressed some reservations concerning the 
prospect of internationalization of the City of Jerusalem. He argued that U.N. direct 
involvement in the administration of Jerusalem might facilitate Soviet penetration in 
the Middle East. Among others, such an evolution would be against Greek interests, 
as traditionally the Soviet Union –Russia’s successor– competed for the protection of 
Orthodox Christians in Palestine. Pipinelis was also afraid that the new Governor of 
Jerusalem would be a Catholic and “keep an unfriendly attitude towards us.”62 
After the adoption of Resolution 181 the primary aim of Greek diplomacy was 
to maintain the status quo in the Holy Land. In January 1948, after consulting with the 
Sophoulis government, the Archbishop of North and South America Athenagoras 
analyzed the views of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem before the Trusteeship Council. In 
his speech Athenagoras strongly supported “the maintenance of the existing rights in 
respect to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites” and claimed that the 
Governor of Jerusalem should be elected “on the basis of special qualifications and 
without regard to nationality provided that he shall not be citizen of the City, the Arab 
State or the Jewish State.” He also argued that the selected Governor “should not 
belong to any of the denominations which have direct interests in the keeping of the 
Holy Places.” Finally, Athenagoras suggested that the Statute of Jerusalem should 
include provisions concerning “the existing character of the Cloisters belonging to 
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any denomination”, “the maintenance of the ethnological and linguistic peculiarity of 
any Church”, as well as the preservation of the property and the administration of the 
Patriarchate.63 
Meanwhile, in December 1948 Israel and Transjordan came to an agreement 
according to which Jerusalem should be divided between the two states with the 
eastern sector (including the Old City) coming under Jordanian rule. However, the de 
facto division of Jerusalem did not attain U.N. recognition. On 11 December 1948 the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 194 (III) which led to the establishment of the 
so-called Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC). The aim of PCC was to mediate 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In September 1949 PCC published a plan which 
established a permanent international regime for Jerusalem. At the same time, the plan 
provided for the division of the city into a Jewish and an Arab zone. However, neither 
party accepted these proposals. As a result, in December 1949 the Assembly restated 
its aim that the city should be placed under a permanent international regime and 
called upon the Trusteeship Council to prepare a plan for Jerusalem.64 
In 1948-49 Greece supported U.N. views on the internationalization of 
Jerusalem. Pipinelis believed that the international status would constitute a guarantee 
for the preservation of status quo in the Holy Land. He also argued that any change in 
the status quo would facilitate Soviet infiltration in the Middle East. He concluded 
that the best solution for the Greek interests in Jerusalem was the implementation of 
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the provisions of Resolution 181.65 Despite their different approaches to the issue, the 
Arab states also favored the internationalization scheme, while Israel was against it. 
Once more, an essentially pro-Arab stance was evident in the Greek attitude. 
However, the problem for Greek interests was that while the great majority of 
the Orthodox flock and Patriarch Timotheos himself lived in Jordan, almost 90 
percent of the Patriarchate property was under Israeli control. Indeed, during and after 
the war Israel had occupied most of the “abandoned property” and refused to permit 
transfer of rent to the Greek Orthodox Church. On the other hand, Timotheos was 
strongly opposed to U.N. views on Jerusalem, as he was afraid that 
internationalization would enhance the Vatican’s influence in the area. Thus, despite 
Athens’ different stance on the issue, the Patriarch negotiated a solution directly with 
the Israeli government.66 
Finally, commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean also played a role 
in the formation of Greek policy towards the Palestinian question. During a period 
when the Greek government intensified its efforts to make a commercial opening to 
the Middle East, Greek policy-makers regarded the establishment of a western-type 
civic state like Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean as a potential competitor for trade, 
shipping and markets.67 However, it seems that in the late 1940s, the economic factor 
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played a secondary role in the formation of Greek Middle Eastern policy. As 
Chatzivassiliou had put it, given the hostile relations between the Jews and the Arabs, 
the emergence of Israel would possibly deepen economic co-operation between 
Greece and the Arabs states.68 
 
The Greek question 
In 1947-49 Greek pro-Arab stance also derived from the need to secure the votes of 
the Arab states on the Greek question before the United Nations. On 3 December 
1946 the Greek delegation to the United Nations had called the attention of the 
Security Council to the situation resulting from the aid provided by Albania, Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia to communist guerillas operating in Northern Greece. On 19 
December the Security Council established a commission to investigate Greek frontier 
incidents. 69  In May 1947, after carrying on its investigation on the spot, the 
commission submitted a report recommending that the Security Council should 
appoint a permanent body to investigate any frontier violations which might occur and 
to assist the governments concerned in settling controversies.70 However, the resulting 
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Security Council stalemate led the U.S. government to refer the issue to the General 
Assembly. The Greek question was to be discussed in mid-October 1947.71 
 U.N. debates on the Greek question placed Athens in urgent need of Arab 
votes.72 In these circumstances, Greek officials stepped up their efforts in order to 
come to an agreement with the Arab bloc. Finally, in return for Greek support on the 
Palestinian issue the six Arab states (Transjordan was not yet member of the United 
Nations) agreed to give full support to Greece at the United Nations. However, in 
early October 1947 the Egyptian delegate at the United Nations, Hussein Heykal 
Pasha, speaking before the Political Committee, called for the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from all Balkan countries. Not surprisingly, Heykal’s speech was 
interpreted as a clear indication that the Arabs would not support the Greek case. 
According to Pipinelis, the Arab attitude was largely affected by Egypt’s priority to 
secure the votes of the Eastern bloc because of the British-Egyptian dispute over the 
Sudan. The Director General of the Foreign Ministry, Ioannis Stefanou, shared the 
same view, while the Permanent Representative to the U.N., Alexis Kyrou, argued 
that the Arab stance on the Greek question derived from “anti-American and anti-
Anglo-Saxon obsessions.”73 
 On 21 October 1947 the General Assembly passed a resolution favorable to 
Greece but the Arab states abstained from voting.74 Though expected, this was a great 
                                                             
71 Van Coufoudakis, “The United States, the United Nations, and the Greek Question, 1946-1952,” in 
Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s, pp. 284-285. 
72 Records of the Council of Political Affairs, 21 September 1947, AGMFA 28/2/1947. 
73 Records of the Council of Political Affairs, 6 October 1947, AGMFA 28/2/1947; and Kyrou to 
Tsaldaris, No. 6110, 2 December 1947, AGMFA 89/5/1947. 
74 Coufoudakis, “The United States,” p. 285. 
Greece and the Palestinian Question, 1947-49 
27 
 
disappointment for Athens, and Greek officials repeatedly protested against the Arab 
stance on the issue. 75  However, the Foreign Ministry adopted Chatzivassiliou’ 
proposal that, despite recent disappointments, Greece should insist on its pro-Arab 
orientation and vote against the establishment of an Israeli state.76 Greece’s pro-Arab 
policy was to bring immediate results: in November 1948 the Arab states supported 
Athens in the discussion of the Greek question in the General Assembly, while 
Pipinelis delivered a speech in favor of the Arab interests.77 
 
Anti-Semitism 
In March 1949 the Greek Consul in Jerusalem George Argyropoulos cabled to Athens 
that if the Sophoulis government did not recognize Israel, this would be interpreted by 
Tel Aviv as an expression of its anti-Semitic feelings.78 It is quite possible that many 
in Israel believed that Greek attitude on the Palestinian question derived from anti-
Semitism. Although the role of anti-Semitism in the formation of Greek Middle 
Eastern policy during the Cold War era has not been studied, there is some evidence 
that in 1947-49 anti-Semitism did affect Athens’ options towards the Palestinian 
question. 
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Recent historiography has already suggested that Panayiotis Pipinelis had 
adopted an anti-Semitic attitude.79 The Permanent Undersecretary has been reported 
as being inspired by the French author Charles Maurras, a figurehead of the anti-
Semitic Action Française. 80  Furthermore, analyzing Greek policy towards the 
partition of Palestine, Pipinelis argued that “by its nature the Jewish element is always 
hostile to the Hellenic political and spiritual world.” He accused both the American 
journalists and the Jewish intelligentsia of hostility in the Greek question and he 
referred to the trade rivalry between the Greeks and the Jews in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. According to Pipinelis, “peaceful cohabitation between the Hellenic 
and the Jewish element is impossible.” He also accused “wandering Jews” of “seeking 
wealth and profit in countries without a strong middle-class.” He concluded that the 
Jews had no national identity and therefore “they always consist a threat to people, 
like the Greeks, who have strong national sentiment.”81 No doubt, the stereotype of a 
wealthy and grasping merchant Jew without national identity was dominant in 
Pipinelis’ analysis. 
 Yet, innuendo there is an important question: given that Pipinelis exerted the 
greatest influence on Greek foreign policy in 1947-49, to what extent was Greek pro-
Arab orientation a result of his anti-Semitism? As the current article has already 
shown, Pipinelis’ policy towards Israel was mainly based on a realistic reading of 
international affairs. Anti-Semitism was an important, but still secondary factor that 
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drove his policy on the question of Israel. In other words, it seems that in 1947-49 
Pipinelis’ anti-Semitic views had been subsumed to political, geographical and 
economic considerations on the Palestinian question. 
 
Western powers and Greek pro-Arab policy 
Greece’s final decision towards the creation of Israel was conditional to the consent of 
both Britain and the United States. As Pipinelis noted on 21 September 1947 (namely, 
after concluding that Greece should adopt a pro-Arab stance) “we have no 
information about British and U.S. attitudes towards the Palestinian question. In any 
case we should not displease them.”82 For this reason, Athens approached both the 
Foreign Office and the State Department in order to explain Greek policy on the issue. 
London clarified that it “would not wish to influence the decision of the Greek 
Government in the matter and that Greek Government should act as seemed best to 
them.” The Americans also replied that they had no objection the Greeks supporting 
the Arab case.83 
London’s reply was consistent with British policy towards the Palestinian 
question after the end of the Second World War. After the loss of India in early 1947, 
it was imperative for Britain to preserve its position in the Middle East in order to 
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protect its status as a great power.84 For this reason Britain had no choice but to 
preserve its close relations with the Arabs. Therefore, on 29 November 1947 the 
British delegation abstained from the vote on the future status of Palestine,85 while 
during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49 British policy was determined by its support 
for its only loyal ally in the region: the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. In this 
context, Attlee’s government supported King Abdullah’s aims for a Greater 
Transjordan, which would include part of Arab Palestine.86 
U.S. attitude towards Israel during the early Cold War era divided Harry 
Truman’s administration. On the one hand, the U.S. President as well as many of his 
advisors and members of his staff in the White House (such as Samuel Rosenman, 
Max Lowenthal and David Niles) favored partition. 87  On the other hand, State 
Department officials (including George Kennan and Loy Henderson, head of the Near 
East Affairs) were against the establishment of an Israeli state. Their attitude was 
determined by two sets of considerations: first, they were convinced that the partition 
of Palestine would open the Middle East to Soviet penetration; second, they believed 
that in case the Americans supported the Jews, U.S. relations with the Arab states 
would deteriorate. U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, Under Secretary Robert 
                                                             
84 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British 
Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 73, No. 
4 (October 2009), p. 7. 
85 Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp. 274-275; and Ellen Jenny Ravndal, “Exit Britain: British 
Withdrawal from the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War, 1947-1948,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 
Vol. 21, No. 3 (2010), pp. 417-419. 
86 Pappé, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 158-159. 
87 Ronald Radosh and Allis Radosh, “Truman, Jews, and Zionists,” in Devine, ed., Harry S. Truman, 
pp. 95-118. 
Greece and the Palestinian Question, 1947-49 
31 
 
Lovett, Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense 
James Forestall shared the same views.88 
 Nevertheless, despite the insistence of American officials that Washington 
should adopt a pro-Arab policy, Truman’s personal sympathy and support to Jewish 
aims remained remarkably constant since the end of the Second World War. 
Therefore, on 29 November 1947 the United States not only voted in favor of the 
partition plan but also put pressure on other delegations to follow suit. As Kennan had 
put it, “without U.S. leadership and the pressures which developed during UN 
consideration of the question, the necessary two-thirds majority in the General 
Assembly could not have been obtained.”89 Furthermore, on 14 May 1948, just a few 
minutes after Israel’s proclamation of independence, the United States recognized the 
provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state.90 Given Truman’s 
constant support on Israel, it seems to be a paradox that Greece chose to dissent from 
the views of its superpower patron. However, U.S. government never brought serious 
pressure to bear upon Greek decision-makers on Palestine. 
In mid-September 1947 the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates of 
the Central Intelligence Group, Theodore Babbitt, concluded that “although Greece 
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has recently been attempting to increase its contacts with the Arab World, it will 
probably vote with the US on the issue.”91 Still, Washington raised no objection when 
the Greek government announced its intention to follow a different stance; nor did it 
react on 25 November 1947 when Greece abstained from voting at the Ad Hoc 
Committee. However, the fact that the partition proposal received 25 affirmative votes 
with thirteen against and seventeen abstentions (thus falling short by one vote of the 
two-thirds majority which would be required in the plenary session) alarmed the 
supporters of partition.92 For the next four days, pro-Zionists intensified their efforts 
to ensure that Greece change its vote. 
On 25 November Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first President, wrote to Truman 
that unless some of the countries which abstained from voting changed their attitude 
before the final vote, the partition plan would fail to obtain a two-thirds majority. 
Weizmann insisted that the U.S. President should intervene “at this decisive hour to 
bring about a settlement.”93  The next day, the President of the American Jewish 
Committee, Joseph Proskauer, asked Lovett to use all his efforts “to get the votes” of 
Haiti, Liberia, Honduras, Philippines, Paraguay and Greece.94 
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Nevertheless, with the opening of the debate in the General Assembly on 26 
November, Greece announced its intention to vote against partition “on the grounds 
that its implementation could create greater disturbance than if no decision were 
taken.” The same day, the delegate of the Philippines stated that his country “could 
not support any proposal for the political dismemberment of Palestine,” while the 
representative of Haiti declared that he would vote against partition.95 In other words, 
Greece, the Philippines and Haiti, namely three of the states which had abstained from 
the voting of 25 November, declared their intention to support the Arab views. As a 
result, 48 hours before the final vote, the establishment of an Israeli state was far from 
being secure. 
On 27 November the leader of the Jewish Agency for Palestine Moshe Shertok 
appealed personally to both Sophoulis and Tsaldaris arguing that Greece should “join 
all other European countries, United States, South Americans, British Dominions in 
only chance effective international action essential for peace of Palestine and future of 
United Nations.”96  The same day, Shertok asked Asher Moissis, President of the 
Central Council of Jewish Communities in Greece, “to approach at this last moment 
your Government in the name of traditional Jewish-Greek friendship and request 
favorable change their position.”97 Furthermore, from 27 to 29 November the Greek 
delegation at the United Nations received more than fifty telegrams from U.S. leading 
personalities (including Republican Senators Styles Bridges and Robert Taft) and pro-
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Zionist organizations asking Greece to support partition.98 Finally, Niles approached 
Tom Pappas and Spyros Skouras, two prominent Greek businessmen in the United 
States, to use their influence in order to change Athens’ attitude towards the 
Palestinian question.99 
Although it was not easy for the Sophoulis government to accommodate all 
these pressures, Greece voted against partition. It has been argued that “American 
pressure apparently came altogether too late for the Greeks.”100 However, there is no 
doubt that despite its reservations, in the end Washington allowed Athens to take a 
different stand on such an important issue. On 29 November, as Dendramis sought 
American advice, Henderson assured him that Greece should not change its vote.101 
On 30 November Tsaldaris said to King Paul that before voting he informed the 
British and the Americans on Greek intentions. Tsaldaris added that although the 
Americans expressed some reservations, they accepted the Greek arguments. 102 
Finally, on 2 December Pipinelis affirmed that “before casting negative vote Greece 
had inquired whether US had any objections and had been assured that Greece was 
free to vote as she saw fit.”103 
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Evidently, the White House showed understanding for Greece’s special 
interests in the Middle East.104 Truman’s administration might have realized that it 
was much more difficult for Greece to change its vote than it was for the Philippines 
or a Latin-American nation which had no interests in the Middle East. Furthermore, 
Greek policy in the Palestinian question could minimize the alienation of the U.S. 
from the Arabs vis-à-vis the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the state of 
Israel. Most importantly, on the day Henderson met Dendramis the Americans had 
already secured a two-third majority in the General Assembly. Indeed, by 26 
November Luxemburg, France, Belgium, New Zealand and the Netherlands had 
already declared that they were prepared to accept partition.105 During the last 48 
hours before the final vote, particular pressure was put on Haiti and the Philippines 
which in the end voted “yes.”106 The Greek delegation managed to resist pressure 
from individuals and non-governmental groups (such as pro-Zionist organizations and 
Senators) among others because its vote was not needed. As a result, no serious 
official American pressure had been exerted on Greece. 
After the U.S. recognition of Israel and the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, 
the Greek government faced a new dilemma: it would either refuse to recognize Israel 
so as not to harm relations with the Arab world; or it would take the opportunity to 
normalize its relations with Israel. Once again, the Truman’s administration gave 
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Athens space for manoeuvre. 107  In any case, Greek attitude towards Israel’s 
recognition could not affect U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In contrast, 
London did influence the Greek attitude towards Israel’s recognition. 
 On 19 May 1948 the Greek Ambassador at London Leon Melas informed 
Pipinelis that Truman’s initiative to recognize Israel just a few hours after its 
proclamation of independence dissatisfied Britain. Melas added that Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin was determined not to compromise on the question of recognition. 
Furthermore, the Foreign Office suggested unofficially that Greece should not 
recognize Israel for the time being.108  On the other hand, Pipinelis knew that an 
immediate Greek recognition would spark strong reactions in the Arab states. Thus, 
he concluded that Greece should advocate a “wait-and-see” policy.109 At the same 
time he suggested that Athens should make every effort to develop further its relations 
with the Arabs.110 
In early 1949 the question of Israel’s recognition was still open for Greeks. On 
25 January the British Embassy in Athens informed the Greek Foreign Ministry that 
Bevin had decided “to consult immediately with the Commonwealth Governments 
and the Western Union Governments concerned with a view to de facto recognition of 
the Israeli Government, having in mind the importance of establishing direct relations 
with that government at an early stage.”111 Indeed, the British recognized de facto the 
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new Israeli government on 30 January.112 The next day the United States extended de 
jure recognition. Now, the Arab states expressed reservations as to the possibility that 
Greece might recognize the new state.113 
Thus, it was imperative for the Greek government to make a decision on the 
recognition issue. Athens was well aware of the Turkish intention not to recognize 
Israel “for the time being.” 114  Pipinelis argued that Greece should not hurry to 
recognize the new state before Turkey so as not to displease the Arab states.115 The 
conclusion of the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel on 24 February 1949 
gave Athens the opportunity to recognize Israel de facto on 15 March.116 Finally, on 
28 March Turkey became the first country with Muslim majority population which 
recognized Israel.117 
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Conclusions 
Greek policy towards the making of the state of Israel was determined by a mixture of 
political, strategic, regional and ideological factors. Among them, the Greek security 
problem during the early Cold War period; the existence of the Greek Orthodox 
Church of Jerusalem; Athens’ need to take into account the position of the Greek 
community in Egypt; commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean; anti-
Semitism; the need to secure the votes of the Arab states concerning the Greek 
question before the United Nations; and, most importantly, relations between Greece, 
the United States and Britain at the beginning of the Cold War era. 
 In 1947-49, at a time of a huge challenge (the Greek civil war) but also of 
dependence on the United States, foreign policy decision-makers in Athens never 
faced a real dilemma on the Palestinian question. All members of the Council of 
Political Affairs as well as the Greek Foreign Minister himself (though he did not take 
an active part on the decision-making process) constantly adopted a pro-Arab stance. 
Athens’ decision to vote against the establishment of an Israeli state and grant Israel 
de facto (and not de jure) recognition offered a clear indication of things to come. 
Indeed, during the Cold War all Greek governments insisted on the pro-Arab 
orientation adopted during the late 1940s. Therefore, they all refrained from fully 
normalizing Greece’s relations with Israel. As a result, Greece recognized de jure 
Israel only in 1990.118 
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Recent scholarship has shown that the United States, Britain and the Soviet 
Union attempted to manage both sides of the conflict in Palestine during the late 
1940s. However, in the case of weaker states such as Greece things were quite 
different. For Greece, the adoption of a pro-Arab attitude resulted automatically to an 
anti-Israeli stance. In the Arab-Israeli dispute Athens felt that if it followed a more 
lenient policy towards Israel (i.e. by voting in favor of partition or by recognizing 
Israel de jure) it would run the risk of completely alienating the Arab world and 
endanger major Greek interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. As seen from Athens, 
the Greek government’s room for manoeuvre was limited. 
The study of the Greek attitude towards the making of the state of Israel 
reveals some interesting patterns of American leadership in the early Cold War. In 
late 1947 the United States recognized that its minor partner felt that it had major 
interests on the Palestinian question, which run counter to American priorities. 
However, when they realized that they did not need the Greek vote at the United 
Nations, the Americans were content to let their minor ally adopt a deviant attitude. 
Washington adopted self-restraint in the imposition of its policy towards Greece and 
as a result Greek Middle Eastern policy in 1947-49 was not dictated by the United 
States. This points to a pragmatic U.S. leadership. Arguably, this ability to give its 
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minor partners some space for maneuver was one of the most important advantages of 
U.S. policy in the troubled second half of the 1940s. 
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